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RE-IMAGINING THE LATINo/A RACE
Angel R. Oquendo*
En medio de esta brumada
me ech6 a sofiar, a sofiar
viejos suefios de mi raza,
mitos de la tierra mia.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Y bien, a fin de cuentas, Zqu6 es la Hispanidad? Ah, si yo la supiera
.... Aunque no, mejor es que no la sepa, sino que la anhele, y la
afiore, y la busque, y la presienta, porque es el modo de hacerla
en mi.2
This Article condemns "racial" subcategories, such as "Black Hispan-
ics" and "White Hispanics," which have been increasingly gaining cur-
rency, and ultimately suggests that such categories should be vehemently
rejected. First, they project onto the Latino/a community a divisive racial
dualism that, much as it may pervade U.S. society, is alien to that com-
munity. Second, they are falsely premised on the existence of an inde-
pendent objective concept of race capable of meaningfully classifying
individuals as "Black" or "White."
Categorizing on the basis of physical features, of course, is an accepted
practice in the United States. In fact, this society has primarily used
physiognomy to create the "Hispanic" category. Yet what really unites
Latino/as is their unique history of oppression. Unlike other immigrant
groups, the largest Latino/a groups-i.e., Mexicans and Puerto Ricans-
did not come into the United States via Ellis Island; they entered the U.S.
reality through the brutal process of U.S. imperial expansion. They were
militarily attacked, invaded, colonized, and annexed. This common expe-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. Ph.D., Harvard University,
1994; J.D., Yale Law School, 1986; A.B., Harvard College, 1983. Thanks to Robin
Barnes, John Brittain, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, Margaret Montoya, Maria
Oquendo, George Schatzki, Petra Stanat, and Barbara Woodhouse. Needless to say,
any heat generated by this Article should be directed exclusively to me.
1. ["In the midst of this fog/I started dreaming, dreaming/old dreams of my race,/myths
of my land."] Juan Antonio Corretjer, La Tempestad y el Ensuefio, in YERBA BRtJA 27
(1992). This is my own literal translation. I will literally translate each Spanish
epigraph in a footnote.
2. ["Well, after all, what is Hispanity? Oh, if I only knew .... Although better not. It
is better not to know what it is and instead to crave after it, to long for it, to search
for it, and to surmise it. For it is thus that I make it my own."] Miguel de Unamuno
y Jugo, Hispanidad, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENcE; EN ToiNO A LA LENGUA
ESPANOLA 264, 268 (1974).
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rience has caused them to form a unified community, which now includes
other people of Latin American ancestry.
Another factor that bonds the Latino/a community is their common
language. Not all Latino/as in the United States speak Spanish, but they
all have some connection with the language. If they do not speak Spanish
themselves, then it is the language of their ancestors. Because they share
a language, Latino/as constitute a race in the sense proposed by Spanish
philosopher Miguel de Unamuno. In fact, in categorizing Latino/as, the
"Anglo" majority has emphasized this common linguistic heritage more
than physical appearance. For instance, the derogatory term that cuts
across the different Latino/a groups is "spik'-which emphasizes how
Latino/as "speak" rather than how they look. More significantly, the
anti-Latino/a movement has coalesced politically in the "English only"
movement, which attacks their linguistic identity.
Latino/as should strive to find strength both in their history and in
their language. They must recognize in their history of subjugation, an
uplifting tale of resistance, survival, solidarity, and love. Latino/as of all
ages and socio-economic backgrounds must increase their knowledge and
awareness of the Spanish language. In the tradition of Unamuno, they
should learn to perceive the Spanish language as a source of unity and
common destiny
]I. A NEW CATEGORIZATION
Soy Mexicana
soy Mexican-American
soy American of Spanish Surname (A.S.S.)
soy Latina
soy Puerto Riquefia
soy Cocoanut
soy Chicana3
In 1978, during my last high school year in Puerto Rico, I took the
SAT. A test of any nature can be intimidating, but one that measures
aptitude can make you feel insecure and challenged at the same time.
hese feelings were accentuated in my case because the exam was in
English, and more important, because it was administered by an organi-
zation from the United States.
I was nervous, in part, because I was being tested by the people who
kept us afloat with their massive economic support, who from afar made
important decisions for us, and who generally were successful where we
had failed. When they came to our land, they were well-off and they ran
many of the large companies. In contrast, when we went to their land, we
were poor, we did the most menial jobs, and we scored the lowest on
intelligence tests. Therefore, the test had a greater meaning for me. It
symbolized America's continuing dominion and control over Puerto Rico.
I was determined to wage a battle that I could ultimately win.
3. ["I am Mexican/I am Mexican-American/I am American of Spanish Surname (A.S.S.)/I
am Latina/I am Puerto Rican/I am Cocoanut/I am Chicana"]. la Chrisx, La Loca de
la Raza C6smica, in NmrrE DrvMsIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CmcANA LrrERATURE 84,
88 (Tey Diana Rebolledo & Eliana S. Rivero eds., 1993).
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I chose to concentrate on the challenge that the test represented, in-
stead of succumbing to any insecurities I had about my ability to perform.
I preferred to perceive the test as an opportunity to prove myself and
vindicate my people. Possessed by an almost insane obsession, I wanted
to show the United States that we were not less capable, that we could
compete against them, and that we could surpass their success in their
own game.
Yet I was caught off guard even before the examination began. While
I was filling out the personal information part, I was asked to identify
myself racially This struck me as odd for two reasons. First, I had never
been asked such a question before. If I had been as cultivated, experi-
enced, and connected as the Joseph Roth character, I too "would have felt
rather bewildered, baffled even, and probably bored and somewhat in-
dignant" in the face of such a query.4 From my perspective, it was simply
unusual to be confronted with the issue for the first time on such a solemn
occasion. Second, I had never thought of myself in terms of race, even
though I was aware of the concept of racial differences. I knew about the
history and reality of racism, yet I did not see myself as a member of a
particular race.
Fortunately, the SAT authorities were wise or benevolent enough to
include "Puerto Rican" among the multiple choices and thus spared me
a potentially profound existential dilemma. There was no need to check
the color of my skin, to feel the texture of my hair, to visualize my facial
features, or to call to mind the physiognomy of my family and relatives.
With a sense of relief, I hastened to check the box labeled "Puerto Rican"
and moved on.
At the time, I was only a kid facing an unexpected situation. Today, I
am a different person and have a different general perspective. Having
now lived in the United States for over fifteen years, I have come to regard
this kind of questioning as normal. In fact, until recently, I considered
myself beyond astonishment with respect to issues of racial categoriza-
tion. I thought that I would always find a box simply labeled "Puerto
Rican," "Hispanic," "Latino," "Spanish Surnamed," or even "Other" with
which I could feel comfortable.
However, racial categories have changed in the last few years. There
has been a development in personal-categorization methods in the United
States that has proven that the capacity of bureaucrats to produce won-
ders and amazement knows no boundaries. I am referring to the relatively
recent tendency to subcategorize the category for Hispanics. Ever more
often, surveys add to that category the following clarification "(Black and
White)'-sometimes "(regardless of race)"-and qualify the White as well
as the Black category with the parenthetical "(non-Hispanic)." So the list
usually reads as follows: "White (non-Hispanic)," "Black (non-Hispanic),"
4. William Pfaff, Revive Secular Citizenship Above 'Ethnic' Nationality, INTL HERALD TmIB.,
July 20, 1993:
The Austrian novelist Joseph Roth says of one of his characters (in a 1924 novel)
that if he were asked to which nationality or "race" he belonged he "would have
felt rather bewildered, baffled even, and probably bored and somewhat indig-
nant"-since he spoke almost all of the European languages, was at home
everywhere in Europe, had his family scattered from Sarajevo to Beijing.
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"Hispanic (Including White and Black Hispanics)," "Asian-American,"
"American Indian," and "Other."
A true bureaucrat's paradise! Yet the average person will inevitably
ask herself what the point of all this hairsplitting could be. There must be
more to this exercise in taxonomic excess than the whims of a lonely
bureaucrat. Granted, the Hispanic category is still being made available
to me. But it is more difficult for me to embrace that category with all the
added attachments and qualifications.
I wonder if I am being told that there is something problematic about
my category? Is the message that it, unlike other categories, needs further
-explanation? Is it implied that after all I do belong objectively to a race
but that I am being given a break as a Latino/as for some undisclosed
reason? The next step will probably be to create separate classifications
for Black Hispanics and White Hispanics and to force Latino/as to choose.
The quandary that I narrowly escaped as a child will thus be returning
-with a vengeance.
A. The Term "Latino/a"
El desgarramiento arrasador ... se le reconoce a los latinos, los
hispanos, como recurrente sefial de identidad. Desgarramiento ar-
rasador lo nominan unos, temperamento producido por una ter-
renalidad esencial lo nominan otros, cultivo de un primitivismo
bello y tajante suelen nombrar algunos cierta explosi6n de vitali-
dad colmada de fervor e instinto que trajina por el dolor y la risa
de los latinos, los hispanos.s
I would like to say a few words about the term "Hispanic" before
posing arguments and counterarguments for the new subcategorization.
"Hispanic" has been rejected by some because of its association with "the
Spanish colonial power of centuries ago."' Those who object to this term
prefer the term "Latino" because it lacks any such connotation and "is
more inclusive and descriptive." 7 The United States Supreme Court re-
cently referred to the petitioner in a suit as "Latino" instead of "Hispanic,"
though it did so only "in deference to the terminology preferred by the
parties before the Court."8 "Latino" has its limitations, but I prefer this
term also.
5.
[A demolishing laceration... is recognized as a recurrent sign of identity among
Latinos, among Hispanics. It is called a demolishing laceration by some; others
denominate it a temperament produced by an essential earthliness. A few give
the name 'the cultivation of a beautiful and peremptory primitivism' to a certain
explosion of a vitality overflowing with fervor and instinct, which hustles along
through the pain and the laughter of Latinos or Hispanics.]
Luis RAFAEL S&NcHFz, LA GUAGUA AMREA 61 (1994) (emphasis in original).
6. Juan Perea, Herndndez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21
HoFsrRA L. REv. 1, 3 n.9 (1992) (citing Nicholas Lemann, The Other Underclass: Puerto
Ricans in the U.S., ATLANIc MoNTHLY, Dec. 1991, at 96; Deborah A. Ramirez, Ex-
cluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L.
REv. 761, 726 n.2 (1993)).
7. Ramirez, supra note 6, at 761 n.2.
8. Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991).
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"Latino" is short for "latinoamericano," which of course means
Latin American in Spanish. Like its English counterpart, the term
"latinoamericano" strictly refers to the people who come from the
territory in the Americas colonized by Latin nations, such as Portugal,
Spain, and France, whose languages are derived from Latin. People
from Brazil, Mexico, and even Haiti are thus all "latinoamericanos."
Individuals who are decendants of the former British or Dutch colonies
are excluded.
"iberoamericanos," in contrast, are individuals who come from Ameri-
can lands once occupied by Portugal and Spain, the two countries on the
Iberian peninsula. Brazilians and Mexicans are Iberoamericanos, but not
Haitians or any of the denizens of countries once claimed by France,
Britain, or the Netherlands. Finally, "hispanoamericanos" are persons from
the former colonies of Spain in the "New World." The expression "His-
panic" probably derives from "hispanoamericanos." 9
An informal interpretation of the term "Latino" would take it to be
equivalent to "hispanoamericano" or "iberoamericano." In other words,
it may be used in a narrower sense to denominate only those who come
from the former colonies of Spain, or only those who come from the
former colonies of Spain and Portugal. In the United States, it appears to
be employed in the narrowest sense, i.e., to identify the children of the
former Spanish possessions in the Americas.
The strict interpretation of "Latino" is more inclusive than the term
"Hispanic." "Latino" encompasses those people who are descended from
the onetime possessions of not only Spain, but also Portugal and France.
However, "Latino" enthusiasts would probably exclude these people from
the category because they use the category in the informal interpretation,
which covers only people from what was once the Spanish empire in
America. Therefore, in practical application, the term "Latino" is no more
inclusive and descriptive than "Hispanic."
The assertion that the term "Latino" should be favored over "His-
panic" because the latter is linked to the brutal Spanish colonization of
America is puzzling. "Latino," in the informal sense, is just as bound up
with the Spanish colonial enterprise. The formal interpretation of Latino
is associated with the similarly objectionable Portuguese and French co-
lonial projects, and both terms exclude the rich African and Native Ameri-
can influence on the Latino/a community.
What I do find attractive about the expression "Latino" is, first, that
it calls to mind the Latino/a struggle for empowerment in the United
States. The leaders of this campaign support "Latino" because it came
9. THE BARNHART DIcTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY enters the following information for
the adjective "Hispanic" from which the noun is derived: "probably shortened
from earlier Hispanical of Spain or its people (1584, formed in English from Latin
Hispanicus Spanish, from Hispania Spain + English suffix -ical)." Tim BARNHART
DIcrIoNARY OF ETYMOLOGY 483 (1988). Its earliest recorded appearance is reported
to have been in 1889. Id. "Ana Celia Zentella, a linguistics professor at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York, traced the origins of the word Hispanic
to 'Hispania,' a Phoenician word for 'land of rabbits' that was used by the Romans
during their conquest of the area that includes modem-day Spain." David Gonzdlez,
What's the Problem with 'Hispanic'? Just Ask a 'Latino', N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 15, 1992, § 4,
at 6.
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from the community." ° The Latino/a people are thus conceived of as not
just acquiescing to their christening by the Anglo majority, but rather as
giving themselves a name. The adoption of the term "Latino" could be
regarded as part of a broader process of self-definition and self-assertion.
Second, "Latino" is a newer term that invites re-thinking and re-defin-
ing of what membership in this community is all about. This attitude of
re-birth and of facing a new beginning is needed as the Latino/a commu-
nity in the United States becomes larger and more diverse and strives to
find itself.
The third reason why "Latino" is a better term is because it is a
Spanish word. It accentuates the bond between the Latino/a community
and the Spanish language. This bond, as I also contend below, is central
to Latino/a identity and unity. Furthermore, in insisting upon being called
by its Spanish name, the Latino/a community is demanding recognition
and respect for its culture. I think the Latina author Sandra Cisneros
probably had this in mind when she declared: "To say Latino is to say
you come to my culture in a manner of respect.""
However, from this perspective, the term "Hispano" would also do.
"Hispano" is the abbreviated form of the Spanish word "Hispanoameri-
cano."' ? It has the additional advantage of being more accurate than
"Latino" in the formal sense. The expression Hispano gained importance
in the 1970s-when it even went all the way up to the United States
Supreme Court 3-but it has since waned.
I am still inclined to favor the newer term "Latino." "Hispano" was
never as prominent as "Latino" in the community's quest for self-defini-
tion. Moreover, I prefer the term "Latino" because it sounds better to my
ear than "Hispano." David Gonzdlez reports that many share my prefer-
ence:
Among those who grew up hearing "Latino" or "Latina" used
often in their neighborhoods and homes, especially in the South-
west, it rolls off the tongue with a Spanish tinge (lah-TEEN-oh),
its very pronunciation an affirmation of identity. By comparison,
the word closest to Hispanic that exists in the Spanish language is
hispano (ees-PAN-oh), or Spanish-speaker, its initial consonant si-
lent in current Spanish pronunciation.1 4
10. The earliest recorded appearance of the word "Latino" in English is 1946. Tm
BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 580 (1988) (entry for "Latino").
11. Gonzdlez, supra note 9, at 6.
12. "Hispano-" in English is a "combined form meaning Spanish, as in Hispano-Aineri-
can." Tnm BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 483 (1988).
13. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1973). The
Supreme Court explained: 'The parties have used the terms 'Anglo,' 'Negro,' and
'-ispano' throughout the record. We shall therefore use those terms. 'Hispano' is the
term used by the Colorado Department of Education to refer to a person of Spanish,
Mexican, or Cuban heritage. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, HUMAN RELA-
TIONS IN COLORADO, A I-hSTORICAL RECORD 203 (1968). In the Southwest, the 'His-
panos' are more commonly referred to as 'Chicanos' or 'Mexican-Americans.'" Id. at
2691 rL6.
14. Gonzdlez, supra note 9, at 6.
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People who do not speak Spanish ineluctably tend to pronounce the
word Iispano in a way that makes it sound even worse. They usually
pronounce the "H" as in English instead of respecting its Castilian silence.
In this piece, I add a slash and a letter "a" to the word "Latino"-viz.,
"Latino/a"-to underscore the fact that the noun describes women as well
as men. The plural then becomes simply "Latino/as." This designation is
only marginally more awkward than the more standard "Latino" but is
more inclusive in a crucial sense.
B. Racial Dualism
Ay ay ay, que mi negra raza huye
y con la blanca corre a ser triguefia;
iA ser el futuro,
fraternidad de Am~rica11
5
The racial subcategorization of Latino/as appears to be an attempt to
project U.S. racial dualism onto the Latino/a community as a whole. It is
possible to imagine my mythical bureaucrat nonetheless attempting to
defend the move as reasonable on grounds of precision: "The categories
are meant to be mutually exclusive. White Hispanics and Black Hispanics,
however, are covered by two of the categories. In order to be accurate,
they would have to check, in addition to the Hispanic box, either the box
labeled 'White' or that labeled 'Black'. We just want to make it clear that
for our purposes, they are Hispanic, even if they are additionally White
or Black. We want each person to choose only one of the options."
Such a plea for exactitude sounds spurious. If the concern were Lat-
ino/as who might fall within two categories, it would make sense to
stipulate that the rubric "Hispanic" includes people who are "racially"
Asian or Indian as well as Black and White. The categories for Asian-
Americans and Native-Americans could be adjusted accordingly to ex-
dude Latino/as explicitly. In this way, Latino/as of Asian extraction as
well as those who descend from the indigenous peoples of Latin America
would know, without a doubt, which category corresponds to them.
Indeed, I think that it is no coincidence that "Indian" and "Asian"
Latino/as have been left out of the picture. The decision to omit these
groups reflects the attitude towards race prevalent in the United States. 6
I will refer to this attitude as "racial dualism". The U.S. racial imagination
posits a bifurcated racial universe, in which the black-white divide over-
whelms all other differences. This conception of race is not surprising in
light of the prominence in U.S. history of the oppression of people of
African ancestry by individuals of European extraction. The institutions
15. ["Ah, Ah, Ah, that my black race escapes/and runs with the white race to become
brown;/To be the future,/fratemity of America!"] Julia de Burgos, Ay ay ay de la grifa
negra, in POEMA EN VsUr stRcos 52,53 (1982).
16. As Cornel West notes, "blackness has no meaning outside of a system of race-con-
scious people and practices." CoRNEL WEsT, RA E MArms 25 (1993). West maintains
that blackness takes a particular meaning in the context of "centuries of racist degrada-
tion, exploitation, and oppression in America." Id. The particular system of race-con-
sciousness that prevails in the United States is foreign to the Latino community in
the United States and so is the conceptual apparatus that corresponds to that system,
including the peculiar notions of blackness and whiteness.
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of enslavement and discrimination have created and reinforced the per-
ception that the opposition between these two groups is essential and
-universal. Racial dualism is but the other side of dualist racism.
The subcategorization of Latino/as should be rejected precisely be-
cause it projects this foreign racial dualism onto the Latino/a community
Among Mexicans, who constitute by far the majority of all Latino/as, the
:main physiognomic influences are not even African and European. Mexi-
cans instead tend to descend from the indigenous peoples who populated
the southern tip and southwest region of North America and the Spanish
who later colonized the territory.
Furthermore, the subcategorization injects a dualism or division of the
races that is alien even to those Latino/a groups, e.g., Puerto Ricans, in
which the principal ethnic influences are African and European. In the
words of Luis Nieves Falc6n:
Because in Puerto Rico prejudices take a subtle and personal form,
there is no organized body of customs or practices against Blacks.
Because social discrimination seems to operate with equal force
against all lower class individuals, regardless of color, there is no
sufficient basis for the emergence of racial conflicts along racial
lines-though, in any case, racial lines are in fact very fluid. Puerto
Ricans-white, brown, or black-have little experience with and a
very limited understanding of the racial animosities that divide
the North American nation and are, naturally, reluctant to take part
in a struggle that is repugnant and meaningless to them.17
According to Nieves Falc6n, U.S. society seeks to impose its racial
conceptions on Puerto Ricans.
Interpreting the behavior of Puerto Ricans in the United States
with respect to racial matters on the basis of their own particular
racial experience, North Americans perceive that behavior as in-
comprehensible, ridiculous, and cowardly. It seems that they would
expect White Puerto Ricans to bond on one side and Blacks on the
other. Puerto Ricans are pressured to adopt one or the other racial
identity, since North Americans cannot really believe that the in-
tegration achieved by Puerto Ricans-imperfect as it may be- is
possible."
Puerto Rican society might have been bifurcated along racial lines up
to the end of the nineteenth century, when its sense of nationality was still
developing. Then, Jos6 Luis Gonzdlez insists, the Puerto Rican "nation
was so divided racially, socially, economically, and culturally, that we
should instead talk of two nations."'9 These two nations-or "ethnic groups
that were true castes"-had radically different "cultural traditions" and
even "Weltanschauungen".20
17. Luis NIEEvs FALC6N, DIAGN6STICO DE PUERTO Rico 275 (1972). The translation of
this as well as other non-English texts in this Article is my own.
18. Id.
19. Jos6 Luis Gonzdlez, El pais de cuatro pisos, in EL PAiS DE CUATRO PIsos Y OrROS
ENSAYOS 9, 25 (1981).
20. Id. at 27, 25-26.
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Gonzdlez himself notes, however, that the U.S. invasion and coloniza-
tion of Puerto Rico in the twentieth century changed the society's struc-
ture in a radical way:
The progressive dismantling of the Puerto Rican elite's culture
under the impact of the transformations that the North American
colonial regime brought upon the national society has had as a
consequence not the "North Americanization" of that society but,
rather, an internal alteration of the cultural values. The vacuum
created by the dismantling of the culture of Puerto Ricans "from
the top" has been filled certainly not by the intrusion of the North
American culture but rather by the ever more palpable ascent of
the culture of Puerto Ricans "from the bottom." 21
Modem Puerto Rican society, Gonzdlez explains, is dominated by a
popular culture in which the African roots are "more important" than the
European or Taino roots and that has "an essentially Afro-Antillean char-
acter."2 Gonzalez's view was anticipated by the poet Luis Pal6s Matos in
an interview:
The black essence lives with us physically and spiritually. Its char-
acteristics-which have been filtered into the mulatto essence-
influence in an evident way all the manifestations of our popular
life .... I therefore know no collective feature of our people that
does not show the trace of that delicious mixture from which the
Antillean character derives its true tone.23
The African heritage is even more pervasive in the Puerto Rican com-
munity in the United States. For the Diaspora consists primarily of the
impoverished sector of the Puerto Rican society, which includes even
more individuals of mostly African extraction than other sectors.
Physiognomically, there are infinite gradations of color, but culturally,
there is a single Afro-Antillean ethos. Thus, if there ever were a well-
defined Black/White polarity among Puerto Ricans, there is none today.
Even the U.S. Census Bureau realized that the realities and the perceptions
of race in Puerto Rico differ from those in the United States. Lawrence
Wright reports that: "By 1960 the United States census, which counts the
population of Puerto Rico, gave up asking the race question on the island
because race did not carry the same distinction there that it did on the
mainland."24
More generally, the Latino/a community is not divided along racial
lines, in part due to the extent of "mestizaje" or racial interfusion in Latin
America. In the words of Eugenio Fernandez M~ndez:
In contrast to what was usual among the Dutch and the English,
the Spaniards did not have excessive racial scruples. This is why
in their Spanish colonies, the process of mestizaje unfolded with
considerable intensity. Only the peninsular aristocracy kept its
21. Id. at 30; see also id. at 34, 36.
22. Id. at 19; see also id. at 22.
23. Angela Negr6n Mufioz, Hablando con don Luis Pales Matos, EL MtNDo, Nov. 13, 1932.
24. Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEw YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 46, 52.
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distance from this process, thus forming a privileged state against
Creoles, mestizos, and mulattos.2u
This historical background, naturally, had a decisive impact on the
racial constitution and the racial attitude of the Latino/a community.
Unlike the broader U.S. society, the Latino/a community is not segregated
into two "racial" groups, with different cultures, identities, and even dialects.
Within this community there is racial consciousness and even racism, but
of a different kind. Lawrence Wright correctly observes that:
[t]he fluid Latin-American concept of race differs from the rigid
United States idea of biologically determined and highly distinct
human divisions. In most Latin cultures, skin color is an individual
variable-not a group marker-so that within the same family one
sibling might be considered white and another black.26
There simply are no discrete, isolated groups, such as White Latino/as
or Black Latino/as. Rather, there are numerous different and overlapping
shades, reflecting the individuals' heritage and to some extent correlating
with their socio-economic class.
The subcategorization might, of course, find support among a minus-
cule minority of "mostly European" individuals among Latino/as, wor-
ried that their categorization as Hispanic might be taken to imply a
:renunciation of their claim to be White. The Latino/a encounter with U.S.
racial dualism, leads to the development "a greater conscience of color
among those who have lighter skin."27 In U.S. society, possessing valid
title to Whiteness requires being free from any encumbrances of Black-
:ness. In other words, the most effective way to assert that one is white is
by categorically denying any connection or kinship to blacks: As long as
one has "one drop of black blood," one is taken to be black.28 These
Latino/as are probably motivated by the desire to distance themselves
unequivocally from Black Latino/as. In their zeal to adopt racial dualism
these Latino/as forget about the mestizaje that is dominant in their com-
munity. They begin to think only in terms of Black or White and neglect
the fact that the majority of Latino/as are Mexicans, whose European
blood is strongly diluted not by African but by Aztec blood.2 9 Thus, their
disassociation has caused them to miscategorize individuals in the tradi-
tion of racial dualism.
25. EUGENIO FERNkNIEZ MINnEZ, HISTORIA CULTURAL DE PUERTO RIco 135 (1980).
26. Wright, supra note 24, at 52.
27. Luis NrvEs FALC6N, DiAGN6SnCO DE PUERTO Rico 276 (1972). Nieves Falc6n is
referring to the Puerto Rican experience, but the same phenomenon appears in other
Latino/a groups.
28. G. Reginald Daniel explains that the "one-drop" rule "was historically implemented
to create as many slaves as possible." Wright, supra note 24, at 48.
29. The self-professed "Euro-Latinos" have undoubtedly brought over some racism from
their lands of origin. But this original racism is reinforced and transformed in the
United States. It thus comes closer and closer to U.S. dualistic racism, discussed
below. By manifesting racist inclinations, these individuals acquire a sense of belong-
ing in U.S. society. In this way, they resemble many European immigrants. See WEST,
supra note 16.
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C. The Poverty of the Concept of Race
la raza
que vida con los n-dmeros pitag6ricos crea 0
Now, what if the racial dualism bias of the subcategorization were
remedied? In other words, what if the re-categorization involved specify-
ing that the category Hispanic includes all races and perhaps clarifying
that the categories "White," "Black," "Asian American," "Native Ameri-
can," and "Other" do not include "Hispanics"? 31 My proverbial bureau-
crat could now refine the defense of the reclassification along the follow-
ing lines: "This is generally a racial classification. For policy reasons
Hispanics must be treated separately, even though they do not constitute
a distinct race. What we are doing is pulling Hispanics from their corre-
sponding racial categories and artificially creating a separate category for
them. The questionnaire simply reflects this reality."
The Office of Management and Budget, in its Statistical Directive
15-which regulates racial and ethnic categorization on federal forms and
statistics-endorses this approach. Latino/as, like all other U.S. citizens,
are taken to fall within one of the four racial groups: American Indian or
Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; Black; and White. As a separate
matter, Directive 15 then divides ethnicity into "Hispanic Origin" and
"Not of Hispanic Origin."32
This whole approach is problematically premised on the existence of
an independently meaningful concept of race that applies to all people,
including Latino/as. The creation of a separate category for Latino/as is
taken to be independent of their status as members of a particular race.
They supposedly continue to be Black, or White, or whatever their racial
classification may be.
Of course, there is no such concept of race. Race is, at best, a very
vague category that generally classifies people in terms of the way they
look. It is, by no means, a precise concept that already classifies Latino/as
and that therefore must be deferred to by a questionnaire.
30. ["the race/that life with the Pythagorean numbers creates."] Rubn Dario, (quoted in
OCTAviO PAZ, CUADRIrvO 11 (1995)).
31. It does not make much sense to refer to Latinos of African ancestry as African
Americans. The term African American suggests a more direct connection to Africa.
It implies that the individual's ancestry can be traced from the United States to Africa.
In the case of Latinos, the ancestry is usually traced from the United States to Latin
America (e.g., Puerto Rico) to Africa. Latinos are thus African-Americans in the sense
that all U.S. Americans are African Americans, i.e., in the sense that their origins (like
the origins of all human beings) can ultimately be traced back to Africa. The appli-
cation of the term Asian American to Latinos is similarly problematic. In contrast, I
would have no objection to applying the denomination "Native American" to Latinos
who descend from the indigenous peoples of Latin America. The "American" part
of "Native American" however, would have to be taken in the non-imperialist sense.
It would, in other words, have to be interpreted as referring broadly to the peoples
of the Americas (North, Central, and South).
32. Lawrence Wright explains that Directive 15 adopted this approach to the classifica-
tion of Latinos in 1977 from the Federal Interagency Committee on Education, which
in 1973 had acted on a request by Caspar Weinberger-then Secretay of Health,
Education and Welfare--"to develop some standards for classifying race and ethnic-
ity" Wright, supra note 24, at 50-52. Wright tells us that the "Hispanic" classification
"was the most problematic of all." Id.
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Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo reports that the
word "race," as used in almost every European language, comes from the
Spanish or Castilean word "raza," which means "ray" or "line." "In
Castilla," Unamuno points out, "one speaks of a 'raza' of sun and each
thread in a cloth is called a 'raza'." 33 The modem term "race" apparently
came to refer to a mark shared by people who are related by heritage. Not
surprisingly, people with resembling physical traits, presumably due to a
common genealogy, came to be seen as belonging to the same race.
"It is easy to see," W.E.B. Du Bois writes, "that scientific definition of
race is impossible." 4 A race simply denominates, in a hopelessly unspe-
cifiable way, a group of people with resembling physical features. It is
hardly persuasive to maintain that such a soft concept of race inevitably
cissifies individual Latino/as in a definite way, which must be respected
by a questionnaire. As Du Bois explains, the physical characteristics on
which the concept of race rides are "too indefinite and elusive to serve as
a basis for any rigid classification or division of human groups." 35
Beyond superficially perceived physical traits, there are no additional
anthropological or biological criteria to give the concept of race a concrete
meaning. In a case on racial discrimination, the United States Supreme
Court reported the following:
Many modem biologists and anthropologists ... criticize racial
classifications as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the
variability of human beings. It is said that genetically homogene-
ous populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous be-
tween populations; therefore, a population can only be described
in terms of relative frequencies of various traits. Clear-cut catego-
ries do not exist. The particular traits which have generally been
chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little
biological significance. It has been found that differences between
33. M. de Unamuno'y Jugo, Hispanidad, LA RAzA VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN TORNO A
LA LENGUA ESPAJROLA 264, 266 (1974). See also M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Comunidad de
la lengua hispdnica, LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VAscuENC E; EN TORNO A LA LENGuA ESPA OLA
165, 169 (1974). ThE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, in contrast, traces the
term "race" to the Italian "razza," meaning "race, breed, lineage" and of "uncertain
origin." THE BARNHART DicriONAY OF ETYMOLOGY 879 (1988) (entry for "race"). See
also THe OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 735 (1966) (entry for "race").
But Joan Corominas and Josd A. Pascual point out that the term appears earlier in
Catalan and even earlier in langue d'Oc than in Italian. They argue, generally, that
"race" is "probably a semi-learned form of the latin ration, -onis, 'calculus or count-
ing', in the already classic sense of 'kind, modality, species'." They maintain that "race
in the biological sense or in the sense of 'species"' is a "foreignism [that] penetrated
the Castilean language." They insist that the already-existing Castilean term "raza"-
which, as noted in the text, Unamuno emphasizes-simply "contaminated" the foreig-
nism "with a pejorative shade." They explain that a "raza" of sun, in the sense of
"the sunlight that enters through a crack," led to the sense of "clarity or sparseness
in a weave." Finally, the sense of "sparseness," they claim, gave rise to the sense of
a "defect" in a cloth or in other things, including humans beings. JOAN CRoMiNAs &
JosP A. PASCUAL, DlccloNAmio CiTIco ETIMOL6GICO CASTELLANO E HISrANICO (Vol.
IV) 800-02 (1981) (entry for "raza").
34. W.E.B. Du Bois, Races, in WRITINGS IN PERIODICALS EDITED BY W.E.B. Du Bois 14
(1983).
35. Id.
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individuals of the same race are often greater than the differences
between the "average" individuals of different races. These obser-
vations and others have led some, but not all, scientists to conclude
that racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather
than biological, in nature.3 6
Masatoshi Nei and Arun K. Roychoudhury are among those scientists
not willing to give up the possibility of a biological concept of race.37
Anthony Appiah, however, persuasively disputes their claim "that their
work shows there is a biological basis for the classification of human
races." "[W]hat it shows," Appiah submits, "is that human populations
differ in their distributions of genes. That is a biological fact. The objection
to using this fact as a basis of a system of classification is that far too many
people don't fit into just one category that can be so defined."-
To the extent that Latino/as physiognomically resemble each other
and differ from other groups, they could be taken to constitute a "race."
The physiognomic differences among Latino/as are probably not much
greater than those among the members of other "racial" groups, such as
"Whites" or "African Americans." In light of the inexorable vagueness of
the concept of race, the idea that there is racial cohesion among Latino/as
is just as plausible as the notion that Latino/as can be internally segre-
gated by race. The concept of race is incapable of providing a meaningful
basis for making significant distinctions between those who fall within
and those who fall without a particular race. It is difficult to take issue
with Appiah when he asserts: "The truth is that there are no races: there
is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us." 39
D. The Evils of the Concept of Race
are neither hispana india negra espafiola
ni gabacha eres mestiza, mulata, half-breed
caught in the crossfire between camps
while carrying all five races on your back
not knowing which side to turn to, run from40
36. Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (citing STEP= MOLNAR,
HUMAN VAIATION (2d ed. 1983); STEHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
(1981); MiCHAEL BANTON & JONATHAN HARWOOD, THE RACE CONCEPT (1975); AsHLEY
MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MY (1974); ASHLEY MoNTAGU, STATEMENT ON
RAcE (3d ed. 1972); SCIENCE AND THE CONCEPT OF RACE (Margaret Mead, Theodosius
G. Dobzhansky, Ethel Tobach, & R. Light eds., 1968); ASHLEY MONTAGU, THm CON-
CEPT oF RACE (1964); RUTH BENEDIcr, RACE AND RACISM (1942); Littlefield, Lieber-
man, & Reynolds, Redefining Race: The Potential Demise of a Concept in Physical Anthro-
pology, 23 CurmNT ANTHROPOLOGY 641 (1982); Biological Aspects of Race, 17 IN'L Soc.
SC. J. 71 (1965); Washburn, The Study of Race, 65 AM. ANTRoPOLOGIsT 521 (1963)).
37. See Masatoshi Nei & Arun K Roychoudhury, Genetic Relationship and Evolution of
Human Races, 14 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 1 (1983); Gene Differences between Caucasian,
Negro and Japanese Populations 177 ScI. 434 (1972).
38. KwAmE ANTHONY ArPIAH, IN MY FATHER's HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CULTURE 196 n.26 (1992).
39. Appiah, supra note 38, at 45.
40. Gloria Anzaldda, By Your True Faces We Will Know You, in NmnE DIviSIONS: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF CmCANA LrrERATuRE, supra note 3, at 81.
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Many have repudiated the concept of race not only because of its
inaccuracy but also because of the sinister purposes it has historically
served. Unamuno's rejection of "racial materialism" provides a case in
point.4' Racial materialism focuses on material or physical characteristics
in defining the concept of race. Unamuno denounces "the materialist cast
that is usually given to the anthropological concept of race."43
In a 1933 article (published on the Day of the Race, "El dia de la
raza"--as Columbus Day is referred to in Spanish-speaking countries) he
asserts that it is the racists who use this material concept of race and adds:
"Today I feel an obligation to insist on this point, in light of the exasper-
ated barbarity, actually savagery, attained by such racism, especially in
Germany."44 He assails "the barbaric sense" given to the materialist con-
cept of race by "the racists, those supposed Aryans of the gammadion and
anti-Christian cross.""
Two years later, in a 1935 radio conference, Unamuno protests that
"the race of corporal or material blood invokes a swastika-a false gam-
madion or hooked cross, an angular and squared wheel-in order to
destroy the people, beginning with their reduction to a kind of epileptic
de-mentality-a pedantic barbarity... a sociological, almost metaphysi-
cal, barbarity that pretends to found a Kulture with a capital K."11
41. M. de Unamuno y Jugo, De nuevo la raza, in LA RAZA VAscA Y EL VASCUENcE; EN
TorNo A LA LEmGUA ESPAJROLA 162, 164 (1974). Interpreted not as general attitude or
prejudice but as a theory of human taxonomy "racial materialism" probably boils
down to what Kwame Anthony Appiah denominates "racialism": i.e., "the view...
that there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, which
allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members
of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not
share with members of any other race." Appiah, supra note 38, at 13. Appiah per-
ceives a direct link between racialism and the horrors of racism: "Racialism is... a
presupposition of other doctrines that have been called 'racism,' and these other
doctrines have been, in the last few centuries, the basis of a great deal of human
suffering and the source of a great deal of moral error." Id.
42. Unamuno opposes a spiritual to the material concept of race. See discussion infra at
text accompanying notes 94-99.
43. Unamuno, supra note 41, at 162; see also M. de Unamuno y Jugo, La fiesta de la raza,
in LA RAZA VAscA Y EL VAscuEmcE; EN TORNO A LA LENGUA ESPAP1OLA 159 (1974).
Unamuno sees a connection between the racial classification of human beings along
these lines and the dassification of animals: "The word 'race', like the word 'caste',
has in its vulgar and ordinary sense a certain animal, irrational, corporal, gross
connotation. For people speak of races or castes of bulls, horses, sheep, dogs, pigs,
etc. The word is similarly applied to man, e.g., when people speak of the white, black,
or yellow race." Id.
44. K. de Unamuno y Jugo, supra note 41, at 162. It was Unamuno's honesty rather than
his prescience that enabled him to perceive the evils of both Nazism and the mate-
rialist concept of race shortly after Hitler took power, long before the war exploded.
Appiah has noted that "with the reality of Nazi racism open to plain view-a reality
that still exhausts the resources of our language-it was easy in the immediate
postwar era for anyone to see the potentialities for evil of race as an organizing
principle of political solidarity." Appiah, supra note 38, at 6.
45. M. de Unamuno y Jugo, supra note 41, at 163.
46. M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Comunidad de la lengua hispdnica, in LA RAZA VAScA Y EL
VASCUENcE; EN TORNO A LA LENGUA ESPAROLA 165, 169-70 (1974).
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James Baldwin refers to this concept of race as a "delusion" responsi-
ble for the grave injustices inflicted upon African Americans in the United
States.47 Albert Memmi defines racism as:
[t]he generalized and final assigning of values to real or imaginary
differences, to the accuser's benefit and at his victim's expense, in
order to justify the former's own privileges or aggression.48
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the direct link between
racial categorization and social injustice. It has accordingly held that clas-
sifications of citizens solely on the basis of skin color "are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality " 49
If racial categories, in addition to having no intelligible substance,
serve mainly as an instrument of oppression, why should they not just be
eliminated altogether? Why not go beyond deleting subcategories, such
as "Black Hispanic" and "White Hispanic"? Why not eradicate all the
general categories too: e.g., "White," "Black," "Hispanic," etc.? In reply to
these questions, I would argue that these general categories should not be
simply quashed. All of the categories should be transformed. They should
be anchored not on the physiognomy, but on the cultural or spiritual life
of peoples. By reconceptualizing themselves, excluded people will be
better able to recapture their identities and to struggle for social justice.
Humanity as a whole would undoubtedly be much better off without
the material concept of race.-° The urge totally to abolish all racial catego-
ries is often inspired by the dream of a society purged of the dreadful
reality underlying the material concept of race.51 Typically, the need to
47. James Baldwin writes: "For the sake of one's children, in order to minimize the bill
they must pay, one must be careful not to take refuge in any delusion-and the value
placed on the color of the skin is always and forever a delusion." JAiMs BALDWIN,
TbE Fn NEXr Tnvm 118 (1963). Lucy White uses the term "race", similarly, "not to
denote physical traits of individuals, but rather to refer to schema of shared meaning
that construct and support social hierarchy by reifying and ranking human differ-
ences." White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. Rsv. 1, 4 n.8 (1990).
48. ALBERT MEMMI, TIrE DOMINATED MAN: Norms ToWARD A PORTRArr 194 (1968).
49. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
50. In the context of the United States, James Baldwin contended that ending "the racial
nightmare" was required in order to "achieve our countr, and change the history of
the world." BALDWIN, supra note 47, at 119.
51. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan notoriously embraced the position that "racial"
categories should be officially banned. Justice Harlan argued that "Our constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 554 ("In
respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the constitution of the United States
does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to
be protected in the enjoyment of such rights."). But he believed that only govern-
mental entities should be required to shun racial classifications. Moreover, he did not
expect "racial" consciousness ever to disappear from U.S. society. "Every true man,"
he noted, "has pride of race, and under appropriate circumstances, when the rights
of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express
such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems proper." Id. at 554.
In Harlan's mind, the U.S. Constitution prohibits public but not private "racism".
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demarcate some human beings from others on the basis of external ap-
pearance is fueled by hatred. This underlying reality is, unfortunately,
well in place. The dream of a racially neutral world remains unrealized.
In many societies people perceive each other mainly in terms of the
way they look. In the United States, in particular, it is a legitimate question
whether there is any hope at all of ever changing this reality. Many
prominent writers have broached the topic of the inescapability of racism
in their writings. Upon calling for an end to the practice of putting values
on skin color, James Baldwin confesses: "I know that what I am asking is
impossible." He nonetheless insists that "in our time, as in every time, the
impossible is the least that one can demand-and one is, after all, embold-
ened by the spectacle of human history in general, and American Negro
history in particular, for it testifies to nothing less than the perpetual
achievement of the impossible."52 This answer encompasses hope in the
possibility that an ever elusive goal will be achieved.
Derrick Bell, however, has expressed a more pessimistic view. He has
taken the position that racism in the United States "is not a curable
aberration, . . . [but] a key component in this country's stability."53 In a
tone completely devoid of Baldwin's hopefulness, Bell also calls for a
relentless struggle against racism despite the impossibility of eliminating
racism: "Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even
those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than
temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrele-
vance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance.
Harlan even concedes (and appears to endorse) the inevitability and permanence of
white supremacy in the United States: "The white race deems itself to be the domi-
nant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains
true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty."
Id. at 559.
52. JAMES BALDWIN, supra note 47, at 118.
Jennifer Hochschild has expressed some concern about the permanence of ra-
cism: "Some have argued that racism is not simply an excrescence on a fundamen-
tally healthy liberal democratic body, but is part of what shapes and energizes the
body." JENNIFER L. HOC-SCHILD, Trf NEW AMEmcAN DrwsmmA 5 (1984). Malcolm
X also often expressed the same pessimism about race relations in the United States.
In fad, Comel West postulates that "[o]ne impulse behind [Malcom X's] internation-
alization of the black freedom struggle in the United States was a deep pessimism
about America's will to racial justice, no matter how democratic America was or is."
WEsT, supra note 16, at 103. This pessimism can even be found in the writing of Alexis
de Tocqueville: "I do not imagine that the white and black races will ever live in any
country upon an equal footing. But I believe the difficulty to be still greater in the
United States than elsewhere. An isolated individual may surmount the prejudices
of religion, of his country, or of his race, and if this individual is a king he may effect
surprising changes in society; but a whole people cannot rise, as it were, above itself.
A despot who should subject the Americans and their former slaves to the same yoke,
might perhaps succeed in commingling their races; but as long as the American
democracy remains at the head of affairs, no one will undertake so difficult a task."
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
.53. DERmCK BELL, FACES AT T=E BorroM OF Tm WELL x (1992). See also id. at xii ("racism
is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society."); id. at 13
("The goal of racial equality is, while comforting to many whites, more illusory than
real for blacks.").
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This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We must acknowledge
it, not as a sign of submission, but as an act of ultimate defiance."
5 4
Even if all racial classifications were officially banned, this might
eliminate overt racism but certainly not the more subtle forms of racism.
Overt or crude racism, which is characterized by openly treating African
Americans as inherently inferior, has been termed "old-fashioned" ra-
cism.55 The transition to the more subtle and covert forms of racism that
prevail in modem society takes place as old fashioned racism becomes
less acceptable. Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio suggest "the
possibility that reduction in overt forms of bigotry may not necessarily
signal the beginning of a more egalitarian era. Instead overt bigotry may
be in the process of becoming a more subtle, insidious form."56 Therefore,
when its ultimate motivating force is taken into account, modem racism
has very much in common with old-fashioned racism. The rise of this
modem racism does not mean that the old fashioned racism has com-
pletely disappeared. In fact, there has recently been a resurgence of old
fashioned racism. Modem racism seems to have made old fashioned
racism fashionable again.
It is tempting to introduce, at this point, the argument that despite the
inevitability of racial materialism in the short run, and perhaps even in
the long run, the government should do everything possible to combat
this awareness. Unfortunately, by simply distancing itself from racial con-
sciousness, the state would be abdicating its duty to combat racial oppres-
54. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
55. McConahay & Hough, Symbolic Racism, 32 J. Soc. Issuss 23 (1976). In contrast,
McConahay and Hough define modem racism as "the expression in terms of abstract
ideological symbols and symbolic behaviors of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished
values and making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo." Id. at 38.
Modem racism, Valerie A. Batts writes, "is based on the assumption, the underlying
belief, that blacks are inferior to whites. The negative effect that accompanies this
belief does not change just because of changes in law and practice. Rather the effect
has to be submerged, given the changes in what is viewed as legal and acceptable."
Valerie A. Batts, Modem Racism: New Melody for the Same Old Tunes 3 (1984)
(unpublished manuscript).
Derrick Bell proposes that modem racism is more pernicious, inasmuch as it is
indirect and, therefore, difficult to combat:
contemporary color barriers are certainly less visible as a result of our successful
effort to strip the law's endorsement from the hated Jim Crow signs .... Indeed,
the very absence of visible signs of discrimination creates an atmosphere of racial
neutrality and encourages whites to believe that racism is a thing of the past.
On the other hand, the general use of so-called neutral standards to continue
exclusionary practices reduces the effectiveness of traditional civil rights laws,
while rendering discriminatory actions more oppressive than ever.
BELL, supra note 53, at 5-6 (1992).
Batts proposes that this racist revival might be "the backlash from a decade or
so of denial in our country that racial problems do continue to exist." Batts, supra,
at 3.
56. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Racism among the Well-Intentioned, in PLURAL-
IsM, RACISM, AND PuBLIc PoLIcy: Thm SEARc FOR EQUALTY 208,220 (Edwin G. Clausen
& Jack Bermingham eds., 1981). They also raise "the possibility that liberal, well-in-
tentioned whites, believing themselves to be unprejudiced, may under specifiable
circumstance behave no differently toward minorities than those who acknowledge
their racial antagonism." Id.
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sion. It would also be upholding a system in which there is no vindication
for the victims of past and present racism.
Some have, accordingly, argued in favor of upholding the existing
material concept of race in order to redress past discrimination as well as
the ineluctable continuation of racism into the future. This strategy would
make sense only if the harm of racism were separable from the racial
categorization. Suppose, for example, that the majority categorized people
racially just to take away some of their income. In this kind of situation,
the harm would be separable from the categorization. Under these cir-
cumstances, it might be reasonable to use the same racial categories sim-
ply to identify and then to indemnify those whose income had been
unjustly diminished.
The injury caused by racism cannot be segregated from the racial
classification in place as suggested by the above example. In fact, racism
is unjust because it only allows a person to be identified by empty racial
categories. Hence, racism not only deprives people of their income; it robs
people of their soul.
III. TRANSCENDING THE CONCEPT OF RACE
The Latinoist movement (Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and
other Spanish-speaking people working together to combat racial
discrimination in the marketplace) is good, but it is not enough.
Other than a common culture we will have nothing to hold us
together. We need to meet on a broader communal ground.57
The struggle for racial justice must go beyond calling for the conser-
vation of existing racial categories. Complete rectification demands a rec-
ognition that the identity of racially oppressed groups transcends their
physical appearance. It must be acknowledged that a more profound
bond between them has been preserved or perhaps created throughout
their history of being racially subjugated and categorized. New categories
based on such a bond could be used to make amends for past, present,
and future racial discrimination.
In his early writings, W.E.B. Du Bois calls for transcending the material
concept of race. He proposes shifting the focus from the "grosser physical
differences of color, hair and bone" to the sociological and historical
differences between human beings.s8 He explains that:
[w]hile race differences have followed along mainly physical race
lines, . . . no mere physical distinctions would really define or
explain the deeper differences-the cohesiveness and continuity of
these groups. The deeper differences are spiritual, psychical, dif-
ferences-undoubtedly based on the physical, but infinitely tran-
scending them.59
He puts forth a new concept of race, which he defines as:
57. Gloria Anzaldida, By Your True Faces We Will Know You, in INmNTTE DIVSIoNs: AN
ANTHOLOGY Op CHiCANA LrrERATuRE, supra note 3, at 81.
58. WE.B. Du Bois, The Conservation of Races, in WE.B. Du Bois SPEAxs: SPEECHES AND
ADDRESSES 1890-1919 73, 75 (1983).
59. Id. at 77.
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A vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and
language, always of common history traditions and impulses, who
are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the
accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of
life .60
Du Bois believes that though the individuals who compose a race, in
his sense, are usually genetically and linguistically related, they must
share a history and a culture. Unlike the early Du Bois, I would stay dear
of race as a general concept of human taxonomy. I would limit myself to
asserting that certain groups can be conceived of as a unit because their
members share a sociological and historical experience. However, it does
not necessarily follow that all persons can be categorized into a determi-
nate number of groups based on sociological and historical criteria.
In his later work, Du Bois actually rejects the concept of race in favor
of that of civilizations. "So far at least as intellectual and moral aptitudes
are concerned," he notes, "we ought to speak of civilizations where we
now speak of races."61 He ultimately rejects the concept of race as hope-
lessly unscientific and incapable of meaningfully classifying human be-
ings. In addition, the later Du Bois appears to be less interested in devel-
oping a general system of human taxonomy than explaining what it is
that binds a particular group, i.e., "the children of Africa".62
Anthony Appiah argues that Du Bois, disclaimers notwithstanding,
remains wedded to the material conception of race: "In his later writings,
Du Bois . . .was unable to escape the notion of race he explicitly re-
jected." 6 Appiah insists that the experience of oppression of Africans is
radically different from that of African Americans. These two experiences
do not have much more in common with each other than they do with
the experiences of oppression of other peoples. The only thing that con-
nects the two is the shared physiognomy of the peoples involved. Inas-
much as Du Bois wants to conflate the two experiences and see the two
peoples indistinguishably as "the children of Africa," Appiah concludes
that he must be influenced by the physiognomic concept of race.64
Appiah's criticism is well taken. It must nonetheless be tempered, as
Appiah himself acknowledges, by the realization that the material concept
of race was enormously powerful and pervasive in Du Bois's time. It was
extremely difficult to rid oneself of that concept's influence, even for
someone set out to eradicate it. To his credit, Du Bois not only realized its
emptiness, but also the need for its elimination. He realized that the
African-American identity should be organized on a common history and
culture, rather than a shared skin color.
Just as some have argued that preserving the existing racial categories
perpetuates race-consciousness, 6 others might protest that any categori-
60. Id. at 75-76.
61. Du Bois, supra note 34 at 14.
62. WE.B. Du Bois, DUSK OF DAWN: AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AuTOBIOGRAPHY OF A RAcE
CONCEPT 137 (1940).
63. Appiah, supra note 38, at 46.
64. See Appiah, supra note 38, at 39-46.
65. In concurring in part in the case United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 (1976), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan acknowledged
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zation of human beings, even along cultural lines, tends to increase di-
visiveness. The response to this contention has been, first, that this may
simply be the inescapable price of pursuing racial justice. Attacking racial
exploitation and making amends for a long history of racial oppression
requires taking the existing categories and turning them against their
original purpose. The conceptual structure that singled out people in
order to undermine them must now be used to empower them. If this
escalates the level of conflict in the United States, so be it.
A more complete rejoinder, however, would start by pointing out that
U.S. society is already ethnically divided in a profound way. This situation
can only improve if people realize that what sets them apart is their
cultural background and not an essence that is supposed to be mysteri-
ously derived from their physiognomy. Difference ceases to be as threat-
ening when it is understood on the basis of culture and history and not
on the basis of empty concepts, such as material race.
The question remains whether the cultural or sociological groups should
still be known as "races" or whether a new concept is called for, as Du
Bois thought. Inasmuch as the term "race" is so deeply associated with
its "materialist" acceptation, its complete eradication undoubtedly sounds
appealing. Abetter concept might be that of "ethnicities" or "ethnic groups."
Despite its long "materialist" past in which it was taken to be synony-
mous with "race," the concept of ethnicity as used today does appear to
focus on cultural rather than on physiognomic difference. The modem
usage is reflected in the following statement: "Ethnicity refers to an or-
ganization of people with their cultural, racial, and linguistic charac-
teristics, whereas race refers to inherited physical qualities."O
The semantic choice between "race," and "ethnicity" to refer to a
particular group was once thought to have substantial consequences.
Latino/as remonstrated against the Office of Management and Budget
because in its Statistical Directive 15, it classified them as an ethnic group
instead of a racial group. They feared that such a classification would
imply that they could not participate in federal programs equally with
other groups that were considered racial. As it turns out, for all practical
purposes, the federal government, despite considering Latino/as an eth-
nic group, treats them on the same basis as other groups.
At one time, there was also a concern that federal courts would ex-
clude "ethnic" groups from protection under civil rights laws aimed at
racial discrimination, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981.67 In 1987 the United States
that remedial racial classifications may increase consciousness of race: "[e]ven in the
pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to
stimulate our society's latent race-consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety
of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's
worth or needs."
66. Martha E. Bernal, George P Knight, Katheryn A. Ocampo, Camille A. Garza, & Marya
K. Cota, Development of Mexican American Identity, in EvMn, c IDENTrrY: FORMATION
AND TRANSMISSION AMONG HisPANcs & OTHE MINoRITIES 34 (Martha E. Bernal &
George P. Knight eds., 1993). But cf. Juan Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond
the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571 (1995) ("Under a
broad definition, ethnicity refers to physical and cultural characteristics that make a
social group distinctive, either in the group members' eyes or in the view of outsid-
ers.") (citing FtAGlN & FEAGlN, RACIAL AND ETNIc RELATIONS 8-9 (1993).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which codifies § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, reads:
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Supreme Court dispelled this preoccupation. In Saint Francis College v.
AJ-Khazraji, it declared:
Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in concluding
that Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable
classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination
solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such dis-
crimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981
to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms
of modem scientific theory .... It is dear from our holding...
that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981
protection.68
The Court thus extended a principle that it had consistently applied
in other contexts: There is no distinction between the legal prohibition
against "racial" and that against "ethnic" discrimination. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, as well as the Constitution and other anti-discrimination
laws,6 makes no distinction between "racial" and "ethnic" discrimination.
There has additionally been some concern that it would be more
difficult for Latino/as, as an ethnic community than for "racial groups"
to bring class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in order to challenge discrimination.7 Rule 23(a) requires those who
want to bring a class action to show that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
71
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
The Supreme Court has explained that: "Although § 1981 does not itself use the word
'race,' the Court has construed the section to forbid all 'racial' discrimination in the
making of private as well as public contracts." Saint Francis College v. A-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604 (1987) (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 174-75 (1976)).
68. 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
69. In Herndndez v. Texas, the Supreme Court established that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited discrimination against Latino/as as well as discrimination against African
Americans. The court proclaimed: "The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely
against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'-that is, based upon differences
between 'white' and Negro." 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
70. See generally Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican-Americans as a Legally Cog-
nizable Class Under Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NomRE DAM L. REv. 393
(1974).
71. FRCP 23(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) reads: "As soon as practicable
after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." The district court must decide
not only whether the requirements of 23(a) have been satisfied, but also those of
23(b).
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The issue is whether it should be more difficult for Latino/as as a class
fltan for "racial groups" to comply with these standards, particularly
those of commonality (2), typicality (3), and adequate representativeness.72
The preoccupation became prominent in 1970 after the Supreme Court
tarned down an appeal from the New Mexico federal district court in
7ijerina v. Henry.73 The district court dismissed a class action complaint by
a group of Chicanos because their "definition of the class was 'too vague
to be meaningful."' (Douglas, J., dissenting).74
The Supreme Court has shown in subsequent cases, however, that it
does not believe that "racial" and "ethnic" class actions should be treated
differently. In Falc6n, the Court quoted a prior case to establish "'that suits
alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class
suits, involving classwide wrongs."' 7- The United States Supreme Court
has, accordingly, approached the question of whether Latino/as qualify
as a class on a case by case basis.7
72. The Supreme Court has explained how these last three requirements are interrelated:
"The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both
serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will
be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also
tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the latter
requirement also raises concerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts
of interest." General Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falc6n, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982).
:73. 398 U.S. 922 (1970).
74. See id. Justice Douglas protested that Hermndez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954)
had "held that 'persons of Mexican descent' constituted a distinct class to which the
equal protection guarantee was applicable." Tijerna v. Henry 398 U.S. 922 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs had "brought this suit as a class action,
claiming to represent a class 'designated as Indo- Hispano, also called Mexican,
Mexican-American and Spanish-American, [which is] generally characterized by Spanish
surnames, mixed Indian and Spanish ancestry and ... Spanish as a primary or
maternal language."' Id. at 922.
75. 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982) (quoting East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez,
431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977)). In the same case, however, it emphasized that "actual, not
presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains ... indispensable." 457 U.S. 147,
159 (1982). See also id. at 156 ("'careful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable'... .") (quoting East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977)). It left no doubt that to sue as
a class, a group-irrespective of whether it is deemed "racial" or "ethnic"-must go
beyond general allegations of typicality, commonality, adequate representativeness:
"we reiterate today that a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only
be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites
of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Id. at 161.
76. In Falc6n the Court wrote: "As we noted in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
'the class determination generally involves considerations that are "enmeshed in the
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action"."' Id., at 160
(quoting Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555,558). Sometimes the issues
are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the interests of the absent
parties are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff's claim, and sometimes it
may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest
on the certification question. Even after a certification order is entered, the judge
remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation.
For such an order, particularly during the period before any notice is sent to members
of the class, "is inherently tentative." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S.; at 469, n.11. This
flexibility enhances the usefulness of the class-action device; actual, not presumed,
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In sum, the choice between "race" and "ethnicity" does not seem to
be in itself terribly important. I have a slight preference for the term
"race." I feel somewhat attracted to Unamuno's call-which will be ex-
amined later on-for the transformation of the material into a "spiritual"
concept of race. My preference, however, is not out of deference to the
adamant reluctance of ordinary and official usage to give up the term
"race." I did not take into account at all a similar reluctance with respect
to renouncing the term "Hispanic."
I believe it may be wise to use the word "race" for other reasons. With
respect to Latino/as as well as other communities in the United States,
the ordinary as well as official reflex appears to be, increasingly, to invoke
the concept of ethnicity The only exception, it seems to me, is the African
American community. I think that the explanation for this is the obsession
with the Black/White dichotomy. Latino/as and other groups should
stand up against that obsession. They should resist the notion that what
distances African Americans is qualitatively different than what separates
them from the white majority. If the majority insists on declaring African
Americans a distinct "racial" group, then all other "ethnic" groups should
insist on being equally described. Such a stance would perhaps contribute
to the de-mystification of the concept of race.
Moreover, the word "race"-or rather the Spanish equivalent "raza"--
has special significance for Latino/as in the United States, particularly for
Chicanos. "Raza" evokes a primeval and mythical union with the indige-
nous people that populated the North American expanse of Aztln. The
natives of Aztln spread south and eventually formed the Nahualt tribes
living in Mexico as the European conquest began, including the Aztecs.7 7
The concept of race also has political connotations. "Raza" is the name
taken by the organizations that initiated and have continued the struggle
for political, social, and economic empowerment of the Chicano commu-
nity These groups-including the party "La Raza Unida" founded by Jos6
Anigel Gutirrez-also encouraged Chicanos to take pride in their history
and culture.
Someone might nonetheless insist on employing the concept of eth-
nicity in this context in order to be able to express the difference between
the spiritual and the material concepts of race. The protester might, ac-
cordingly, propose the labels "ethnicity" for the former and "race" for the
latter. My reply would be, first, that the material concept of race is empty
and its preservation is not worth too extreme an effort. Second, it could
conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, indispensable. Falc6n, supra note 72,
at 159.
Compare General Tel. Co. v. Falc6n, 457 U.S. 147, 158-59 (1982) ("Without any
specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that were common to
the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought to represent, it
was error for the District Court to presume that respondent's claim was typical of
other claims against petitioner by Mexican-American employees and applicants.")
with Castafieda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) ("In this case it is no longer open
to dispute that Mexican-Americans are a dearly identifiable class.") & White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) ("Consistently with Herndndez v. Texas, the District Court
considered the Mexican-Americans in Bexar County to be an identifiable class for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes.")
77. See ENcicLoPEDiA DE MXXco vol. 1 539 (f.R. Alvarez ed., 1976) (entry for "Aztlin").
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be simply denominated, following Unamuno, "the material concept of
race" whenever it is to be discussed or distinguished from the spiritual
concept of race. When "race" is used by itself, unqualified, it could then
be taken to mean the spiritual concept of race.
Anthony Appiah would probably not be persuaded. He takes Thomas
Sowell to task for giving the term "race" a meaning other than its material
one. Appiah believes that almost no one employs "race" in a non-material
sense anymore: "The word is used almost exclusively to refer to the
purported major biological divisions of humanity." He provides "two of
the principal arguments... against using the term 'race' to mean ethnic-
ity":
First, the human differences that matter for social life aren't bio-
logical, and that is exactly what calling them "races" has usually
implied since the development of race science in the nineteenth
century Second, the groups that are of sociological interest, the
groups that have cultures, not only are not biologically homoge-
neous, they are not even of the right scale to be the races that the
race scientists were after.8
Yet these are arguments against the material concept of race, not
against the term "race" itself. Appiah's single argument "against using the
term 'race' to mean ethnicity" is simply that the word "race" was last used
in any such sense "when [his] mother was a girl." Because today race is
almost universally taken in its materialist sense, Appiah seems to believe
that invoking the term "race," even while purporting to advance an ethnic
interpretation, is tantamount to endorsing the material concept of race.
Appiah is undoubtedly right in his description of contemporary Eng-
lish usage. But if such usage is so misguided, why defer to it? Why take
such care to allow people to continue thinking in terms of the material
concept of race-which Appiah himself regards as irremediably bank-
rupt? Why not take up arms against the usage, along with the underlying
material concept of race? Why not propose a different, more constructive
use for the term "race"? People might, in response, start thinking differ-
ently and realize the emptiness of their prior conceptions. A spiritual
concept of race could, moreover, focus on what Appiah might call the
"sociologically correct" human differences, and identify "groups that have
cultures" and are therefore "of the right scale."
A. African Americans Struggle Against Otherness
Yo s6 de un pesar profundo
Entre las penas sin nombres:
-La esclavitud de los hombres
es la gran pena del mundo!7 9
78. K. Anthony Appiah, How to Succeed in Business by Really Trying, 42 N.Y. Rnv. Boos
29, Jan. 12, 1995.
79. ["I know a profound burden/among the unspeakable sorrows:/Human slavery/is
the great sorrow of the world!]. Jos6 Marti, XXXV, Versos Sencillos, PoEsfAs COM-
PLETAS 106, 107 (1953).
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The traditional racial classification in the United States, of course,
involves African Americans. Since slavery, the white majority has per-
ceived the African American people as "the other." The "otherness" of the
African American people was already well in place at the foundation of
the United States nation. The Constitution quite literally refers to African
Americans as "other Persons." 0 And this perception of the African Ameri-
can people as an "other" is very much part of U.S. society's present reality.
Derrick Bell makes this point: "The fact is that, despite what we designate
as progress wrought through struggle over many generations, we remain
what we were in the beginning: a dark and foreign presence, always the
designated 'other.' "'8
The rhetoric of the "other" and of "otherness" derives, I believe, from
the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. In his Science of Logic, Hegel examines the
concept of the "other" in order to show that it inevitably emerges in the
process of thinking, how it proves to be intrinsically problematic, and how
this internal tension is resolved. The other is first posited in order to
supply determinacy and constitution to a "something" that has no being.
A something relates out of itself to the other because differentiation
[Anderssein] is posited in it as its own moment. Its intrinsic being
[Insichsein] encompasses negation. Through this negation, the some-
thing now generally has its affirmative determinate being [Dasein].
The other is also distinguished qualitatively from this determinate
being. The other is excluded from the something. The only quality
of the something is the negation of its other, for it becomes some-
thing through this supersession of its other1'
A something cannot be conceived of without the contrast that the
other provides. The process of thinking of something necessarily involves
the process thinking and excluding an other. Without the other, the some-
thing dissolves into nothing. That is, if it cannot be established what it is
that a something is not, absolutely nothing can be said about that some-
thing. The something therefore must demarcate itself from its other. It
acquires a content by negating, by limiting, and by constraining its other.
Beyond this initial phase, the concept of the other proves problematic.
The other is perceived as being opposed to something, threatening its
existence. Something cannot be conceived of in a concrete way as ex-
pected, if the other appears in the abstract, unspecified, unlimited. What
is thought of as the other seems to encompass even what was originally
thought of as something. In the final phase of this dialectic, this conflict
is resolved. The other is cognized concretely and is known as an intrinsic
part of something. The other, thus, gives not death but actually life to that
something.
80. U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, d. 3, amended by U.S. Const. amend XIV. I am indebted to
John Brittain for reminding me of this fact.
81. BELL, supra note 53, at 10.
82. GEoRG WLHmELM FMrEDRICH HGcEL, WISSESCIFr DER LoGiK (WErKE 5) 135 (1986).
See also G.W.F. HEGEL, ENZYKLOPADIE DER PnnLosopmscI-IE WissENscHAFrEN I (WrEMU
8) §§ 91-92 (1986). For a discussion of Hegel's notion of the other, see MICHAEL
THEUNiSSEN, SIN UND SCIN: DiE KRrrisCi FUNiKTION DER HIEGELSCIEN LOGIM
236-97 (1980).
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In accordance with the first phase of this dialectic, the white majority
has no identity except to the extent that it constructs and demarcates itself
from its other. Ralph Ellison thus maintains that the white majority has
felt pressed to demarcate itself from the African American people in order
to compensate for its uncertain sense of identity.
Since the beginning of the nation, White Americans have suffered
from a deep inner uncertainty as to who they really are. One of
the ways that has been used to simplify the answer has been to
seize upon the presence of Black Americans and use them as a
marker, a symbol of limits, a metaphor for the "outsider."D
Further, as "something," the white majority has positive qualities only
to the extent that it projects the negative onto its "other." Kimberl6 Cren-
shaw, for instance, argues that the White majority relies on its disempow-
ered other in order to delude itself into believing that it has real power:
"By focusing on a distinct, subordinate 'other,' whites include themselves
in the dominant circle-an arena in which most hold no real power, but
only their privileged racial identity.""
The White majority has, more generally, reinforced its sense of own-
ership, of freedom, of intelligence, and even of divinity by perceiving its
other as a piece of property, as a slave, as an ignoramus, and as a demon.
This transformation of the African American people into an "other" is
rothing but the "gradual dehumanization" that Albert Memmi identifies as
typical of racism. He describes the process thus:
The racist ascribes to his victim a series of surprising traits, calling
him incomprehensible, impenetrable, mysterious, strange, disturb-
ing, etc. Slowly he makes of his victim a sort of animal, a thing or
simply a symbol. 5
As its other becomes completely alien and unrecognizable, the white
majority comes to see its other as a problem and a threat.6 It starts calling
83. RALPH ELLISON, WHAT AMEcANs WOULD BE LiKE WrrHouT BLACKS (1970).
84. Kimberl Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HIAv. L. Rr. 1331, 1380-81 (1988). Derrick Bell insists
that racial oppression plays a
critically important role in U.S. society and therefore proves impossible to sup-
press: Almost always, the injustices that dramatically diminish the rights of
blacks are linked to the serious economic disadvantage suffered by many whites
who lack money and power. Whites, rather than acknowledge the similarity of
their disadvantage, particularly when compared with that of better-off whites,
are easily detoured into protecting their sense of entitlement vis-h-vis blacks for
all things of value. Evidently, this racial preference expectation is hypnotic.
BELL, supra note 53, at 7. And further: "Whites are rallied on the basis of racial pride
and patriotism to accept their often lowly lot in life, and encouraged to vent their
frustration by opposing any serious advancement by blacks. Crucial to this situation
is the unstated understanding by the mass of whites that they will accept large
disparities in economic opportunity in respect to other whites as long as they have
a priority over blacks and other people of color for access to the few opportunities
available." Id. at 9.
85. MEMMIr, supra note 48, at 195.
86. In The Souls of Black Folk, WE.B. Du Bois describes how the white majority perceives
the African American people as "a problem": "They approach me in a half-hesitant
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for the annihilation of its other. It loses sight of the fact that its own
existence depends on the other.
The material concept of race has played a key role in the demarcation
of the other. It has thus facilitated the alienation of and the onslaught on
the African American people. It has served to corral African Americans
and subject them to crude and as well as to subtle forms of racism.
The concept seizes on what most evidently sets the other apart: physi-
ognomy. The underlying premise is that physiognomy will engender mean-
ingful distinctions. Physiognomy is supposed to be the criterion of other-
ness. In other words, if someone meets the physiognomic requirements,
she is taken to have all the attributes of otherness.
As already noted, simply eliminating this spurious concept will not
solve much. The reality corresponding to the concept would undoubtedly
survive the concept's eradication. African Americans have suffered (and
continue to suffer) untold abuses that must be redressed. But, more im-
portantly, the diverse individuals of African descent in the United States
have become one people. Their shared experience of oppression has cre-
ated a bond of solidarity among them. They have developed a common
identity that goes beyond the material concept of race.
Many African Americans have suggested transcending the traditional
concept of race in order to articulate that identity. Comel West, for in-
stance, challenges U.S. society "to replace race reasoning with moral rea-
soning, to understand the racial phenotype but rather as a matter of
ethical principles." 7 He has called for the rediscovery of a vibrant culture
of resistance and solidarity.
The genius of our Black foremothers and forefathers was to create
powerful buffers to ward off the nihilistic threat-to equip Black
folk with cultural armor to beat back the demons of hopelessness,
meaninglessness, and lovelessness. These buffers consisted of cul-
tural structures of meaning and feeling that created and sustained
communities; this armor constituted ways of life and struggle that
embodied values of service and sacrifice, love and care, discipline
and excellence.88
African Americans can vest their collective existence with significance
by understanding their shared history along these lines. The material
concept of race has nothing to contribute to their quest for self-under-
sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then instead of saying directly,
How does it feel to be a problem, they say, I know an excellent colored man in my
town." W.E.B. Du Bois, Thm SouLs OF BLACK FOLK (1903). Cornel West connects Du
Bois's observation with the contention of Dorothy I. Height, president of the National
Council of Negro Women, to the effect that liberals regard African Americans as
"problem people." WEsT, supra note 16, at 2. Cornel West protests that by treating
African Americans as outsiders, European Americans have abdicated any responsi-
bility in ameliorating the relationship between the races: "As long as black people
are viewed as a 'them,' the burden falls on blacks to do all the 'cultural' and 'moral'
work necessary for healthy race relations." Id. at 3.
87. WAEsT, supra note 16, at 25.
88. WEsT, supra note 16, at 15. West also identifies this "cultural armor" against the
"nihilistic threat" with a large "love ethic." West sees such a love ethic depicted "on
a number of levels in Toni Morrison's great novel Beloved." Id. at 19.
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standing. They must go beyond that concept in order to transcend their
otherness.
13. A New Latino/a Self-Understanding
Yet there is a pilgrimage,
a history straining its arms and legs,
an inexorable striving,
shouting in Spanish
at the police of city jails
and border checkpoints,
mexicano, dominicano,
cubano, puertorriqueflo,
fishermen wading into the North American gloom
to pull a fierce gasping life
from the polluted current.89
Latino/as constitute another people that has been categorized out of
the U.S. mainstream. They too have entered the dialectic of otherness. It
is very revealing that they are often classified along with African, Asian,
and Native Americans as "non-White." Thus, the focus of the category
"Hispanic" has often been physiognomy This category has managed to
survive despite its anthropological emptiness and despite the wealth of
ethnological difference among individuals that fall under it. The same is
true about the corresponding category for African Americans.
The "Hispanic" category has played a role parallel to that of the
category that subsumes the African American people. It too has served
the white majority to identify a people and to make that people into an
underclass. Consequently, in order to battle the insidious discrimination
and to alleviate the effects of its long history, a similar approach must be
taken in both cases. The categories should be not just eliminated but
rather transformed. Their aim has to be transformed from destruction to
empowerment.
The African American people, for its part, has not limited itself to
transforming its category in order to address the problem of invidious
discrimination. They have tried to find in their new self-understanding a
source of pride and strength. The African American community has at-
tempted to create for itself a forceful identity on the basis of its African
heritage. Latino/a people can find inspiration in this African American
struggle. Latino/as too would have much to gain if they could discover
in their common legacy a source of unity.
What should be the basis of the new Latino/a self-understanding?
What is the bond that unites them and gives meaning to their common
existence? First, Latino/as share a unique experience of oppression and
survival in the United States. Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, who constitute
the largest and oldest Latino/a communities within the official borders of
the United States, were attacked, invaded, colonized, annexed, and ex-
ploited by the United States.
89. Martin Espada, Heart of Hunger, in THE IMMIGRANT ICEBoy's BOLERO 15 (1982).
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Unlike European immigrants, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans did not just
come to the United States. Rather the United States came to them in a very
real sense. Mexicans became part of the U.S. reality as a result of the U.S.
expansion into the Mexican territory in the southwest region of North
America. In the words of Albert Camarillo:
The history of the Chicano people as an ethnic minority in the
United States was forged primarily from a set of nineteenth-cen-
tury experiences. This country's war of annexation against Mexico
(and the Texas Revolution a decade earlier) led to American acqui-
sition of a vast territory and its Spanish-speaking population. Chi-
cano history is, thus, part of that larger history of westward ex-
pansion by the United States and its subsequent domination of
societies with different racial, cultural, socioeconomic, and political
characteristics. 0
Chicanos "reached" the Anglo world in the nineteenth century as their
land ceased to belong to Mexico and was taken over by the United States.
The Anglos then accelerated their migration into former Mexican territory
and gradually became the dominant dass.91 The Chicano community was
born as the Mexican people were gradually subjugated to minority status.
Mexican immigration in the twentieth century has been essentially
directed towards those same lands that once belonged to Mexico. Mexican
immigration, which parallels Anglo migration in the previous century, has
strengthened the bond of the Chicano community with its Mexican roots.
The new immigrants, hence, simply joined a centuries-old community,
which was once one with their own. These two communities were not
previously separated, but a border was established in the aftermath of the
Mexican-American War. Those who arrived more recently gradually be-
came part of the Chicano community on the basis of a shared culture and
experience of subjugation.
Puerto Ricans, in turn, entered the U.S. reality following the U.S.
invasion of their country in 1898. The invasion was part of the Span-
ish-American war. Upon its military defeat, Spain signed the controver-
sial Treaty of Paris, in which it transferred its colonial powers over Puerto
Rico to the United States. Puerto Ricans became citizens of the United
States by a unilateral act of Congress in 1917. The degree of political
autonomy enjoyed by Puerto Ricans has increased throughout the years,
but the United States has never given up its ultimate power over Puerto
Rico.
Puerto Rican immigration to the continental United States started
shortly after the military occupation but exploded after the Second World
War.2 Puerto Ricans arrived as one of the most socially and economically
90. ALBERT CAMARILLO, CHICANOS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: FROM MlEXICAN PUEBLOS TO
AMBmucAN BARRios IN SANTA BARBARA AN SoUTHERN CALIORNIA, 1848-1930 (1979).
91. See Ronald Takaki, Foreigners in their Native Land: Manifest Destiny in the Southwest, in
A D=RENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 166-90 (1993).
92. Manuel Maldonado Denis refers to the dramatically increased Puerto Rican immi-
gration to the continental United States after the Second World War as a "massive
exodus." MANUEL MALDONADO DENis, PUERTO RICO Y ESTADOS UNIDos: EMIGRACI6N
Y CoLoNiALISmo 82 (1984).
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impoverished groups and have retained that status.9 The phenomenon of
Puerto Rican immigration is, at any rate, not just a logical consequence
but actually part and parcel of the United States policy of absorption of
Puerto Rican land into its territory and of the Puerto Rican people into its
citizenry The United States has dominated Puerto Ricans who reside on
the island, as well as those who live on the continent.
Both Chicanos and Puerto Ricans, hence, share a history of being
militarily and then socially under siege. They were brought into U.S.
society by war and conquest. They did not just move into U.S. territory.
Instead, the confines of that territory were expanded to engulf them. Once
"inside", they became an underclass, systematically perceived and treated
as a conquered people.
Both Chicanos and Puerto Ricans can therefore rejoice over the fact
that they have somehow managed not to be completely destroyed as a
people. They have been able to survive recurrent attempts to assimilate
them and to annihilate their cultural existence. Against all odds, they have
been able to cultivate their Latin American roots and develop an identity
that allowed them to resist the aggression. And the community that emerged
has absorbed subsequent migrations of Latino/as-including Cubans, Gua-
temalans, Salvadorans, Dominicans-who often share, in addition to the
Latin American heritage, an experience of oppression in the United States.
Just as African Americans seek to base their self-understanding on their
resurrection from slavery, Latino/as should trace their identity back to
their resurrection from imperialist conquest.
IV. LANGUAGE AS A SOURCE OF LATINO/A UNITY
Ni azteca ni espafiol: criollo Por tanto el primer hombre de una
especie nueva Y hall6 su identidad en el idioma que vino con la
cruz hecha de espadas94
Amor mifo en el mar navegamos de vuelta a la raza, a la herencia,
al vokcn y al recinto, al idioma dormido que se nos salia por la
cabellera en tierras ajenas.95
The writings of Unamuno point to a second source of support for the
Latino/a identity. In addition to rejecting the materialist concept of race,
Unamuno postulates a different, spiritual concept of race. Clearly influenced
by Johann Gottfried Herder's notion of "Sprachgeist," Unamuno's spiri-
tual concept of race turns on language. 6 In other words, a race encom-
93. Maldonado Denis asserts that "Puerto Ricans occupy the last rung on the social
ladder in U.S. society." Id. at 6.
94. [Neither Aztec nor Spanish: Creole. Therefore/ the first man of a new spices/ and
he found his identity in the language/ that came with the cross made of swords.]
J.E. de Carvalho Pacheco, Francisco de Terrazas, in FmN DE SIGLO 62, 62-63 (1984).
95. [My love, while at sea we navigated back to the race, I to the heritage, to the volcano,
and to the terrain, to the dormant language/coming out of our hair in foreign lands.]
Pablo Neruda, Regreso, in LA BARCAROLA 15 (1977).
96. The German term "Sprachgeist" means literally spirit of speech or language. Herder
believed that the spirit of a people was expressed, first and foremost, in its language.
Johann Gottfried Herder, Ober den Ursprung der Sprache, in SXMvrrucnn WMUM 28-29
(Bernhard L. Suphan ed., 1891).
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passes a group of people that share a language.9 7 Unamuno is thus able
to transform the concept of race in order to rally for the unity of Spanish-
speaking peoples.98
Unamuno declares: "Language, the instrument of spiritual action, is
the blood of the spirit and all those who think and, therefore, feel and act
in Spanish are part of our spiritual race."9 He suggests that the spiritual
aspect should be the focus of the Day of the Race:
The celebration of the Hispanic race-i.e., of the Spanish-language
nations-cannot be based on the physiological, somatic or material
concept of race. The Spanish-language nations-language is the
blood of the spirit-include very different material races, Ameri-
can Indians, blacks, Jews .... 110
97. Unamuno is convinced that language defines the human spirit "A language (idioma)-
'idioma' originally means property-is the root rather than the depository of tradi-
tions. It embodies a vision and an audition of the world-universe, a conception of
life and of human destiny, an art, a philosophy, and even a religion." M. de Unamuno
y Jugo, Comunidad de la lengua hispanica, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN
ToRNO A LA LENGUA ESPAOLA 165, 167 (1974).
98. 'he scientistic (not scientific) jargon of sociologists, jurists, pedagogues, and other
international (not universal) pedants was capable at one point to put at risk the
radical cultural and spiritual unity of the Spanish-speaking peoples. But today we
all feel the need to establish and insure our respective personalities-which are the
basis of our national independences-in a common popular personality. We therefore
know where to find the tradition upon which to found the progress of our universal
destiny" M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Comunidad de la lengua hispdnica, in LA RAzA VASCA
Y EL VASCUENCE; EN TolRo A LA LENGUA EsPAoLA 165, 170-71 (1974).
99. M. de Unamuno y Jugo, La fiesta de la raza, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN
TORNO A LA LENGUA ESPAJIOLA 159 (1974). Unamuno also declares: "If [the Latin-be-
rian-American is a crucible of races], the flux of its diverse spiritual and dialectical
races-including the Castilean-must be our common language, always in a process
of transformation and of greater Hispanic integration. Other foreign languages, to be
sure, may function as catalysts-to use a chemical metaphor. They may operate as
guides to help us discover the living entrails of our common language. For the study
and knowledge of other languages advances the study and the improvement of our
own. To take possession of our language is to recuperate our land as well as our
spiritual independence and liberty." M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Comunidad de la lengua
hispdnica, in LA RAZA VAscA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN TORNO A LA LENGUA ESPAROLA 165,
172 (1974).
100. M. de Unamuno y Jugo, De nuevo la raza, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN
ToRNO A LA LENGUA ESPANOLA 162 (1974). In a different article, Unamuno states:
"When people speak of the so-called Celebration of the Race, I think that the cele-
bration should instead be referred to as the Celebration of Language or of the shared
language." M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Comunidad de la lengua hispfinica, in LA RAZA
VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN TORNO A LA LENGUA ESPAIOLA 165, 169 (1974).
Unamuno would, of course, not exclude people of Asian origin from the "His-
panic Race" He expressly includes Filipinos, such as the martyred rebel Jos6 Rizal.
He declares: "Jos6 Rizal, that heroic Filipino, also belonged to our spiritual race, to
our spiritual blood, to our Spanish language--even though his material blood was
Tagalog and Chinese. But he thought, felt, spoke, and wrote in Spanish .... " M. de
Unamuno y Jugo, La fiesta de la raza, in LA RAZA VAscA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN TOiNo
A LA LENGUA ESPA&iOLA 159, 159-61 (1974). See also M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Comu-
nidad de la lengua hispdnica, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN TORNO A LA
LENGUA ESPA.&OLA 165, 171-72 (1974).
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Unamuno believes that all these people by virtue of their shared
language possess a unity that transcends their difference in material race,
nationality, religion, and political regime."'
I am still skeptical about the need for as well as the possibility of a
successful general taxonomy of human beings through the concept of
race. Unamuno's spiritual concept of race is nevertheless interesting be-
cause it suggests a source of unity for the Latino/a people in the United
States. The Spanish language is a central part of the shared heritage of
Latino/as even though not all Latino/as speak Spanish. Often, Latino/as
only have a historical connection to the language because their parents or
grandparents were Spanish speakers, so the language constitutes a poten-
tial source of unity.
The association of the Latino/a "race" with the Spanish language,
:interestingly enough, parallels the identification of the African American
"race" with skin color. Just as the white majority has focused on skin color
-to "denigrate" African Americans, it has used the Spanish language to
disparage Latino/as. That is not to say that the majority has overlooked
Latino/as skin color, which some have inherited from their Indigenous
and African ancestors. But the primary focus for anti-Latino/a sentiment
in the United States has been the Spanish language. In constructing a
single category for this abundantly diverse group of peoples, U.S. society
has obsessively concentrated on their common linguistic heritage. It is no
coincidence that the derogatory term applied across-the-board to all Lat-
ino/as is "spik," which underscores not the way Latino/as look but the
way in which they speak, or rather "spik." The Spanish language has
become their badge of "otherness." Even when Latino/as speak English
this badge manifests itself in the form of an accent.
The anti-Latino/a fervor has recently taken the form of the English-
only movement.'0 This political movement portrays Latino/as as danger-
ous because of their language. It perceives the Spanish language as a
threatening foreign influence that must be eradicated to preserve cultural
purity. Latino/as are, accordingly, forced to renounce their language and
identity in order to embrace the dominant culture.
African Americans have struggled to take pride in their blackness as
a first step towards becoming aware of a vibrant culture of resistance and
solidarity.1 Similarly, Latino/as must learn to celebrate their language if
1.01.
The Celebration of the Race, of the Spanish spiritual race, should not and cannot
be taken in a racist, materialist sense-the sense of race materialism-nor in an
ecclesiastic sense--based on one or another Church-nor, all the less, in a politi-
cal sense. All imperialism except that of the spiritual race incarnated in language
must be banished from the celebration. A language of whites, of indians, of
blacks, of mestizos, of mulattos. A language of Catholic Christians and non-
Catholic Christians, as well as of non-Christians and atheists. A language of men
living under the most diverse political regimes.
M. de Unamuno y Jugo, De nuevo la raza, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENcu; EN
TORNO A LA LENGUA ESPAiOLA 162, 164 (1974).
102. I must express gratitude to John Brittain for making me see the English-Only Move-
ment as a product of the way in which Latinos are viewed and categorized.
103. Comel West has called for the rediscovery of the vibrant culture I refer to. See WEST,
supra note 16, at 15.
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they are to find strength in their common identity. The process of redis-
covering the Spanish language might take them back to the first immi-
grants or even farther back to their ancestors in Latin America. They
might find a meaning and a sense of renewal in their history, in their
culture, and in their struggle against oppression both in the United States
and in Latin America.
It is therefore crucial to resurrect the Spanish language among the
Latino/a community. The children should learn Spanish, not only because
in many cases this helps their learning in general, but also because they
will thus be able to secure a sense of identity and belonging. The Spanish
language should also be brought to the adult population: in centers of
adult education, in unions, in church organizations, in prisons, in reha-
bilitation programs. The point is not to create a prerequisite to member-
ship in the Latino/a community, but rather to give Latino/as an oppor-
tunity to reconnect with their roots and open up a path towards a common
identity.1 Latino/as will thus be in a position to achieve a sense of unity
among themselves similar to that advocated by Unamuno for the entire
Spanish-speaking world.
The final objective should by no means be to construct a Tower of
Babel on North American soil. The idea is not to discourage Latino/as
from learning English because they need to master this language for
social, political, and economic survival. Moreover, the English language
may be an instrument for Latino/as to feel more at home in the Spanish
language. "For the study and knowledge of other languages," as Una-
muno points out, "advances the study and the improvement of our own." 103
The advocates of mainstreaming would undoubtedly take exception
to my proposal. They would not be placated, even in the unlikely event
that they conceded that learning Spanish does not necessarily impede the
104. Similarly Unamuno did not intend to ostracize those who live in Spanish-speaking
countries but do not speak Spanish themselves. He recognizes that many of the
indigenous peoples of America speak their own languages: "It is worth adding that
even though mestizo and mulatto crossbreeding has resulted in many indigenous
Americans thinking and feeling in Spanish and even though many pure American
Indians think and feel in the Spanish language, there are probably more who still
think and feel, love and hate, enjoy and suffer, see and dream in their old pre-Co-
lumbian tongues." M. de Unamuno y Jugo, De nuevo la raza, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL
VASCUENCE; EN TORNO A LA LENGUA EsPAiOLA 162 (1974). Unamuno would certainly
decry any attempt to force these peoples to give up their languages. Yet he would
probably encourage teaching them Spanish in addition to their own languages. By
participating in the Spanish linguistic community, these peoples will not only enrich
the Spanish language with new perspectives but also be in a better position to
appropriate their own language and culture. "For the study and knowledge of other
languages advances the study and the improvement of our own." M. de Unamuno
y Jugo, Comunidad de la lengua hispdnica, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN
TORNO A LA LENGUA ESPAOLA 165, 172 (1974). By the same token, Unamuno would
advocate supporting the diverse linguistic traditions that coexist in Spain. See, e.g.,
M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Hispanidad, LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENCE; EN TORNO A
LA LENGuA ESPAROLA 264,266 (1974) (Catalan, Aragonese, Leonese, Bable, Castilean,
Galician, and Portuguese have become "literary and official languages. And these
languages are the races."). See also M. de Unamuno y Jugo, La raza vasca y el vascuence,
in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL VASCUENcE; EN TORNO A LA LENGUA EsPAiqoLA (1974).
105. M. de Unamuno y Jugo, Comunidad de la lengua hispdnica, in LA RAZA VASCA Y EL
VASCUENCE; EN TORNO A LA LENGUA EsPARoLA 165, 172 (1974).
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mastery of the English language. They would point to the danger of
increased divisiveness and recommend the path of integration and assimi-
lation for Latino/as. That path, however, is not an option. The reason is
not simply that Latino/as, even if prepared to become fully conversant in
the dominant tongue and ways, will not be willing to give up their
cultural distinctness. More important, the majority will probably never be
disposed to accept them completely as part of the mainstream. The ma-
jority today fences out--discreetly but unequivocally-even those Lat-
ino/as prepared to repress their cultural identity.
Even if the path of full integration were possible, it would not be
desirable. Latino/as must survive as a distinct group not only to demand
restitution for foregoing and ongoing subjugation, but also to recover their
robbed sense of identity. They must reinvigorate and repossess their dis-
tinct identity in order to overcome fully their marginality. Subjecting them
to homogenizing integration would amount to the culmination of their
oppression. Indeed, it would be the final declaration that their difference
is not worth preserving.
The pluralist alternative, to be sure, does entail some risks. It could
lead to increased divisiveness if espoused in an irresponsible manner, so
it must be adopted in a constructive spirit. Latino/s must become knowl-
edgeable and enthusiastic about their language and culture, but not by
disparaging that of others. If the various other communities similarly
embraced the notion of mutual respect, it would be possible to achieve a
higher unity that preserves difference.
The best scenario would be if the proposed expansion of the Spanish
language spilled over into the non-Latino/a communities. This could be
nothing but a boon to the larger U.S. society. As Unamuno would un-
doubtedly point out, the diffusion of the Spanish language throughout the
United States territory will not attenuate, but rather enhance the appre-
ciation of the English language. Furthermore, the wide-spread mastery of
a second language, such as Spanish, among U.S. citizens might increase
their awareness of the world of diversity outside, as well as, inside their
own borders. They might thus be better positioned to meet the challenges
presented by foreign and domestic pluralism. All of this might even make
the U.S. society-both at home and abroad-less hegemonic and oppres-
sive and more tolerant and noble.
V CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Una raza unida,
la que Bolivar soft6. °6
The suggestions I have made in this Article regarding racial categori-
zation will not be considered for some time, if at all. I expect to continue
to encounter questionnaires that racially subcategorize Latino/as. My mythic
bureaucrat will keep insisting that I accept notions such as "Black I-ls-
panics" and "White Hispanics." She will continue to try to convince me
that I can be Hispanic "regardless of race." The implication is that I belong
to a material race-preferably Black or White-whether I like it or not.
106. ["A united race, which Bolivar dreamt."] RUB9N BLADES, Siembra, on SIEMBRA (LP
Record 1977).
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It is, granted, a distortion thus to give the impression that the culprits
of this taxonomic nonsense are "the bureaucrats", individually or as a
class. This new classification scheme is only a part of the insane logic of
racial thinking in the United States. The bureaucracy has simply generated
categories relying strictly on that logic. Therefore, the battle against the
racial subcategorization of Latino/as must be waged as part of a larger
war against the existing racial categorization.
The crusade against the material concept of race is not new, let alone
easy. It has been going on for years under the direction of brilliant com-
manders such as Du Bois and Unamuno. It has been difficult, as the
objective of obliterating the attitudes and institutions built on the material
concept of race proves ever more elusive. In the United States, in particu-
lar, both sides in the debate on race appear to have accepted that concept
as inevitable and to argue exdusively over its application in public and
private life.
The struggle against the material concept of race in the United States
must therefore continue and intensify Communities that have been organ-
ized into the different material races, must reject that concept with vehe-
mence. If they demand that the majority treat them as spiritual races, then
they will rid themselves of the incoherence and evils associated with the
material concept of race. In the process, they will be well on their way
towards an enlightened self-understanding.
United States society must come to realize that the "other" consists of
African Americans, Latin Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Ameri-
cans. Once this realization is attained, a new conceptual scheme might
develop-a scheme that will not break down when confronted with the
fact that Latino/as may be black, brown, red, and even yellow or white.
United States society might finally be in a position to appreciate the unity
as well as the diversity of each of its peoples. Maybe then the "other," as
anticipated by the Hegelian dialectic, will at last be recognized as "some-
thing."
If the material concept of race were to begin to fade even the notion
of a "white race" would gradually lose its meaning. If bent on surviving
as a distinct group, the individuals that now form part of that "race"
would have to look beyond the color of their skins for a bond of unity.
Other than their material race, however, they only share a history of
oppressing people of color. Their cultures and traditions otherwise vary
wildly. It is for this reason that the term "Euro-American" is, for all
practical purposes, completely empty. As the notion of "white race" dis-
integrates, consequently, the group of individuals that is described by this
term would lose its cohesion.
It could be argued that what in fact unites these individuals is their
historical opposition to non-White groups, and that even after the demise
of the material concept of race, this opposition could persist as a source
of solidarity. I have two reactions to this argument. First, the material
concept of race will not vanish by itself. Its underlying and supporting
reality must cease to exist. To imagine its disappearance is to imagine the
disappearance of that reality. That reality includes the disempowerment
of non-white peoples, which makes it possible and advantageous for
whites to define themselves in opposition to them.
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My second reaction is that the hateful source of solidarity is effective
today, to a great extent, because it does not have to operate in the open.
in such a covert environment, the white majority can assert that its com-
munity is bound by color, and not exclusively based on hate. If the real
source of solidarity were unmasked, it would lose much of its effective-
ness. The allegiance of many members of that purported community
would falter and the peoples of color would resist more decisively
The individuals that today form part of the "white race," to be sure,
would not have to end up entirely uprooted with the death of racial
materialism. Some of them could connect with a narrower community,
such as that of Irish Americans, Italian Americans, Polish Americans, Greek
Americans, and so on. More important, any of them could connect with
the larger U.S. community, which would, naturally, indude peoples of
color.
Their communal bond, in any case, would probably not have the
strength of that of the peoples of color, particularly of African Americans.
No bond of solidarity can be more robust than that of a community that
has together been subjected to, resisted, and survived brutal oppression.
That community has paid a high price for that virtually indestructible
bond. As Voltaire put it, "misery confers rights." 1 7
It may seem a waste of time to go on speculating about the end of
racial materialism. As conceded earlier, that possibility may be remote or,
ultimately, an impossibility. Yet dreaming about the end of racial materi-
alism enables human beings more effectively to cope with and struggle
against racial materialism, as long as it exists. They thus are in position
to demystify it and to diminish its destructive impact on them.
The Latino/a contribution to the de-reification of racial materialism
could be decisive. Their very presence in the United States traumatizes
the material concept of race. They are a large and distinct ethnic group in
the United States that does not fit adequately into any of the existing racial
categories. The system's first reaction is to construct a new material race:
viz., Hispanics. This approach, however, loses its appeal with the realiza-
tion that some Latino/as resemble people belonging to some of the tradi-
tional material races.
It is at this point that the subcategories are born. New and complicated
subcategories are produced to describe this group that subverts the pre-
vailing racial premises. Instead of resolving the incoherence of the mate-
rial concept of race, however, the subcategories make it more apparent.
They highlight the arbitrariness of the existing racial classification system.
There are simply no reliable criteria to determine who falls into which
category or subcategory.
By insisting on their unity, Latino/as will not only continue exerting
pressure on the material concept of race. They will also recover their sense
of belonging and self-worth. As suggested, their common identity must
be based on their peculiar history of colonial subjugation and on their
bond with their language, which was spoken long before English in what
today is United States territory.
107. Voltaire, Candide, in RoMANs ET coNTEs 179, 205 (1966).
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In reclaiming their identity, Latino/as must stand up against violent
opposition. The majority has attacked them more fiercely than any of the
other immigrant groups because they have been perceived as belonging
to a different material race, because their real and potential numbers
dwarf those of any other group, and because there is already a long
history of war against them. The aggression has taken different forms-
military operations, assimilation programs, sterilization projects, exploita-
tive labor practices, political disenfranchisement, discriminatory treatment,
linguistic homogenization drives, and anti-immigrant measures-but its es-
sence has always been the same.
By resisting, Latino/as will be opening up space for their collective
self-realization. Furthermore, in demanding recognition as a distinct and
unified community they will be pressuring U.S. society to be more open
and tolerant. United States society may not be ready to renounce racial
materialism or to empower its racial underclasses. But Latino/as should
emphatically refuse to become accomplices in the propagation of racial
materialism or to capitulate to their own disempowerment. They should
instead strive to present themselves to the rest of U.S. society as a com-
munity that is not stratified by the material concept of race and is founded
on what unites rather than on what divides its members.

